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Abstract:  
Latin America is known as the most unequal region in the world, where extreme 
displays of wealth and exposure to scarcity lay bare in the urban landscape. Inequality is 
not just a social issue; it has considerable impact on economic development. This is 
because social inequality generates instability and conflict, which can create unsettling 
conditions for investment. At the macro level, social inequality can also present barriers to 
economic development, as most government policies and resources tend to be directed in 
solving social conflict rather than to promote and generate growth. This is one of the 
reasons usually cited in explaining the development gap between Latin America and other 
emerging economies, take East Asia for example - they have similar policies to those 
applied recently in Latin America, but are achieving better growth. The other reason cited 
is institutional; this includes governance as well as property rights and enforcement of 
contracts. The latter is the focus of this chapter.  
Using a range of literature including official documents issued by local governments, peer 
reviewed academic journals and latest media articles from the national press of each 
country, the chapter argues that a defective planning system, scarcity of distributive 
mechanisms for land taxation and weak municipal powers are incentivising an 
unscrupulous real estate residential market that is profiting from this confusing scenario. 
This is not only restricting the options for housing the poor but is also fuelling urban 
inequality and hindering economic development in Latin America. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Cities produce 50% of gross domestic product that manifests in increasing competition to 
attract development and real estate (RE) investment (World Bank, 2013). However, 
parallel growth in inequality suggests that this expansion is not benefiting all citizens 
(Lima, 2006; Bourguignon et al., 2007). Latin America (Lat. Am.) is reportedly the most 
unequal region in the world and the question that always remains is why a region with 
such a wide range of natural resources, scores so highly in the Gini Index? Policymakers, 
academics and experts are increasingly concerned over the widening gap between Lat. 
Am. countries and developed economies (de Soto, 2001; Sacks, 2006; Fukuyama, 2008; 
Edwards, 2010). Some highlight social inequality as the main reason for this gap 
(Fukuyama, 2008; González and Martner; 2012) while others claim that globalisation is 
mostly to blame (Stiglitz, 2002; Chomsky, 2010). 
It has been stated that the solution lays in security of property rights (de Soto, 2001; 
Fukuyama, 2008). de Soto (2001) argues that Lat. Am.’s poor sit on dead capital (their 
homes) due to unsecured property titles, which hinders collateralisation of RE to acquire 
entrepreneurial capital. His views have been challenged (Varley, 1987; Samuelson, 2001; 
Gilbert, 2002; Frankema, 2006; Van Gelder, 2009) but followed and praised by regional 
governments (Fernandes, 2002; Clift, 2003). But the title’s legalisation theory is based on 
simplistic assumptions that miss the nuances existing in Lat. Am.’s land markets; see, for 
example, Van Gelder (2009) for an in depth discussion. In addition, it assumes that the 
underlying planning system in most of these countries is sophisticated enough to secure 
urban land equity (using here the term in its dual connotation). As it will be argued in this 
chapter, planning as well as redistributive mechanisms of land tax must be regulated if Lat. 
Am. countries intend to achieve a robust system of property rights. 
Given the importance of property titles and home ownership that has been stressed so far 
in academic discussions, this chapter looks into the question of inequality from 
the perspective of the residential RE sector. It will look at how the development of housing 
evolved in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Colombia from the 1970’s to current times. It will 
present an overview of the relation between government housing policies and 
development/planning regulations, which are shaping the urban landscape. At the lower 
end of the residential sector, it will consider informality and social housing, and at the 
higher end, it will look at new luxury gated developments. Where are they located in 
comparison to informal developments? Are low and high end markets competing to 
purchase the same land? How does that competition fare? If so, what redistributive 
mechanisms do local governments have in order to spread prosperity? The objective is to 
bring to light the counterproductive housing policies that have been pursued over the 
years to help the poor in order to improve their standards of living and to contribute to 
economic development; to reveal the lack of governance and accountability that 
municipalities have; and to signal the scarcity of planning regulations to control speculative 
housing development. The final objective is to exhibit the difficulties arising when RE 
profits are only benefiting a very small percentage of the population. The information 
presented in the chapter is collected from official documents, government as well as 
international organisations, peer reviewed academic journals and latest media articles 
from the national press of each country. The collected literature is in Spanish, Portuguese 
and English. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section two provides a brief summary of 
the region’s socio-political background whilst section three explains how informality spread 
and social housing debt amounted through decades of neglect in the selected countries. 
The fourth section looks at the process of market liberalisation. In The fifth section building 
the way out of recession is considered whilst section six discusses the main findings and 
their implications for economic development. The chapter is concluded in section seven.  
2. SOCIO-POLITICALBACKGROUND OF THE REGION   
Historically, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile share the legacy of military governments that 
scarred the political scene and influenced the welfare systems of their countries. Colombia 
on the other hand, never suffered a military rule to the scale of the others, but suffered and 
indeed still suffers, from more than 50 years of internal civil conflict against illicit drug 
trafficking; there was a coup d’état in 1953 but democracy was restored in 1958 
(Arismenedi, 1983; and for a revision of authoritarian tendencies and their roots in Lat. 
Am., see, Collier, 1978). Despite the differences in their own struggles and conflicts, all 
these countries share the transition from tariff-protected manufacturing industries, known 
as import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) (Macario, 1964) during the 1940’s to the 
1980’s, followed by the adoption during the 1990’s of very important economic 
recommendations known as the Washington Consensus (World Bank, 1993 and 1994; 
Gilbert 2002; Stiglitz, 2002). Broadly speaking, this implied the reduction of the state, 
decentralisation, privatisation, opening of markets, and deregulation. The transition from a 
heavily protected economy that favoured domestic products towards open competition had 
a direct impact on RE markets - commercial and residential RE investment was ripe to 
produce high returns given that the market had been heavily protected and stagnant for 
decades (Roberts, 2005; Thibert and Osorio, 2014). In addition, privatisation of 
infrastructure services also attracted foreign direct investment, which in the case of 
motorways shaped the new spatial organisation of the cities by encouraging residential 
ghettoisation; a process that is known as fragmentation of the urban space (Bäbr and 
Borsdorf, 2005). 
It must be pointed out that Chile had an earlier start towards liberalisation of markets as 
some of these recommendations were already underway in the country after the military 
coup of 1973 (Arellano, 1982; Rojas, 2000; Guilbert, 2002; MINVU, 2004; de Soto and 
Torche, 2004; Garcia de Freitas and Cunha, 2013). Among wider economic aims, the 
reform intended to attract more private investment and enable the housing market to work 
more efficiently, with the hope that the housing deficit in all sectors of the population could 
be solved by private investment with the Chilean State acting as a facilitator. But as the 
Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo (MINVU) (2004) explains, the reform took some time 
to develop and get established. Furthermore, some even claim that its visible results only 
arrived with the return of democracy in 1990 (Rojas, 2000). This means it took Chile nearly 
twenty years to adapt to the economic reforms introduced in the 1970s. Argentina, Brazil 
and Colombia attempted to take that leap in a few years (late 1980’s and early 1990s), 
with mixed reviews on the consequences of these reforms (McKenzie and Mookheriee, 
2003; Castañeda, 2006; Stglitz, 2007). Lack of transparency in the privatisation process 
and a lack of mature institutional framework capable of dealing with the sophistication that 
international private investment demands have been blamed for the economic crises that 
affected the region after market liberalisation: starting with Mexico’s Tequila crisis in 1994, 
Brazil’s hyperinflation crisis in 1999, and ending with Argentina’s default in 2001(Stiglitz, 
2007).  
On the other hand, supporters of liberalisation claim that in some countries’ privatisation of 
utilities, such as electricity and telecommunications have increased access to these 
facilities for the poor (McKenzie and Mookheriee, 2003). Notwithstanding, the authors 
acknowledge the scarcity of data availability, as it is very difficult to measure accessibility 
to public services when most people live in informality and have, therefore, no legal access 
to formal connections. Furthermore, they also acknowledge that in most cases they could 
not measure the quality of the service the population receives. 
The last point is particularly important as Lat. Am. governments are demonstrating a 
concern over the quality of what has been achieved so far in urban development (Murray 
et al., Forthcoming). Qualitative attributes to assess sustainable prosperity are increasingly 
taking importance over quantitative attributes (Parris and Kates, 2003). As these authors 
argue, local understanding of sustainability as well as political, economic and cultural 
factors affect the multiplicity of indicators that have been developed so far. As a result and 
two decades after the experience of market liberalisation, Lat. Am. is pursuing its own 
methods to develop social policies in accordance with regional theories of sustainable 
growth; these look at reaching economic targets while simultaneously ensuring: (a) equal 
share of prosperity among all sectors of society; (b) reducing carbon emissions; and (c) 
avoiding the depletion of natural resources (Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2010, 2012 and 2014). Notwithstanding, some countries' policies 
towards equitability are seen as too populist (Edwards, 2010) and said to be inflicting 
further damage to Lat. Am.’s economies. This question of populist government and urban 
equality is central to the selection of countries under study here. 
The selection of the countries is based on the political classification presented by a 
political scientist Jorge Castañeda (2006). As this author explains, there are two lefts in 
Lat. Am.: the “reconstructed left”, a fusion of communist, socialist and Castroist 
tendencies, which has evolved by learning from past mistakes and intends to develop new 
policies that can keep the region as an important player in the global market; and the 
“populist left”, which has a deep attachment to nationalism and tends to be anti-
globalisation (Castañeda, 2006, pp.34-35). There is also the centre and centre right that 
dominated the scene during the 1990’s. This political division clashes in the way societies 
and governments intend to compensate for the years of social neglect that the region’s 
poor have suffered. A clash that seems to have little hope for compromise solutions and 
manifests in recent street protests across all countries under study here: student revolt in 
Chile, anti-World Cup demonstrations in Brazil, workers’ strikes in Argentina and anti-
national government protests in Colombia to support a leftist mayor in Bogota. The 
common denominator in all countries is the accumulated social debt and the conflicting 
approaches in trying to solve inequality. 
Following Castañeda’s political spectrum, the selected countries in this chapter 
demonstrate different tendencies but more relevant is their housing policies and 
development regulations that intend to bring urban equity, which in turn is supposed to 
contribute to economic development. Argentina, representing the populist left, has seen 
the coalition of mostly socialist parties (Frente para la Victoria) win successive elections 
since 2003; the same year that Brazil, representing a “tenuously” reconstructed left 
(Castañeda, 2006, p.35) saw the rise of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (workers party) 
who are also still in power. Chile, a straight reconstructed left, has followed this tendency 
for almost two decades and after a short period with the centre-right (2010-2014), has 
recently returned to where it previously was, with a newly formed coalition of leftists parties 
known as Nueva Mayoría. The exception here is Colombia that has been mostly moving 
from the right to the centre-right, and with the Unidad Nacional coalition currently in power. 
Therefore, the selected countries represent a spectrum of policies to tackle inequality from 
different political angles.  
3. SPREAD OF INFORMALITY AND ACCRUING SOCIAL HOUSING DEBT  
During the 1960’s and early 70’s housing policies in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Colombia 
were directed to supply housing to  those in formal employment; the literature on housing 
policies for these countries is quite vast, the most relevant for this period are: (a) for 
Argentina, Zanetta (2005), Barreto and  Alcala (2008), Barreto (2013); (b) for Brazil, 
Valladares (1978), Andrade and Azevedo (1982), Melo (1992), Bonduik (1998); (c) for 
Chile, Arellano(1982), Collins (1995), Kusnetzoff (1987), Rojas (1999), Silva Lerda (1997); 
and (d) for Colombia, Ceballos Ramos and Saldarriaga Roa(2008b), and Cuervo and 
Jaramillo (2009). All these authors agree that the policies failed to target the unemployed 
and those working in informal or casual jobs, which negatively affected economic 
development. This, at the time, was a considerable failure given that the informal sector 
counted for more than 60% of the population (Silva Lerda, 1997). As a consequence, 
informality increased and with it, governments’ policies of slum clearance and relocation. It 
is worth pointing out that there was also a belief, particularly, among military governments 
that the situation of the unemployed would reach a breaking point, forcing them to be 
eventually absorbed into the formal economy. There was also the theory that Marxist 
activists as well as drug cartels were infiltrating informal settlements, using them as a 
focus of resistance, indoctrinating residents and recruiting the young into their networks. It 
is the main reason why governments tended to ignore social policies and continued with 
slum clearance programmes.  
In Chile, the military imposed strict controls over the expansion of informal developments 
which generated another problem: the allegados, the family’s relatives and friends arrived 
to share already developed houses, adding overcrowding to already infrastructure-thirsty 
urban environments (Rojas, 1999). In Argentina new laws were passed with the clear 
intention of discouraging informal settlements on outside boundaries. The Ley 8912 of 
1977 classifies the periphery of Buenos Aires for recreational use and non-permanent 
residence, and specifically refers to country clubs (second holiday homes) as the preferred 
typology for the area (art.7) (Gobierno de Buenos Aires, Legislación, Decreto-Ley 8912/77; 
Thuillier, 2005).  Encouraged by favourable legislation and the gradual opening of 
motorways that linked the periphery to the centre, residential RE investment moved to the 
suburbs developing country clubs for the wealthy. Paradoxically, the very few social 
housing schemes for those in formal employment and low wages were also being 
developed in the periphery. Affordable land was attracting all market sectors, making social 
housing compete for land with speculative projects. As it will be demonstrated later, this 
process only aggravated with the arrival of market liberalisation policies in the 1990’s. 
Meanwhile the exodus to the periphery began in all countries under study here, and the 
vacated city centres were gradually taken up by squatters or laying empty and neglected 
(Bäbr and Borsdorf, 2005).  
The state was at this time the main provider of social housing, responsible for the 
financing, planning and delivery of the projects. Institutions involved were usually a 
national mortgage bank and a relevant government institution at the national level that 
coordinated all actors (local governments, construction companies and beneficiaries). The 
schemes delivered by these institutions were generally low cost mass-produced housing 
units with very little infrastructure. The largest example of housing units built during the 
1970’s in Lat. Am. is located in Sao Paulo and has 84 5-storey height housing blocks, with 
no public transport, a problem that has not yet been adequately solved, taking today’s 
residents a whole two hours of commuting to the city centre (Budds et al., 2005).  
The landscape of the 1970’s and 1980’s was, therefore, of increasing informality and 
insufficient and low quality social housing stock. In addition, given the high inflation, most 
state owned mortgage banks were running large deficits and there were allegations of 
corruption in the system (Valenca, 1992; Zavaletta, 2005; Tachópulos Sierra, 2008 and for 
a more positive view on the state’s abilities to finance social housing programmes see, for 
example, Cuervo and Jaramillo, 2009). Spatially, the tendency of country clubs in the 
peripheries was not only hollowing out the city centres, but there was also the 
fragmentation of the society by the polarisation of the urban fabric. In these conditions, 
countries followed the Washington Consensus recommendations with the view that the 
private sector could help to bridge the social divide.  
4. TRANSITION AND LIBERALISATION OF MARKETS 
4.1 Social Housing Policies until the end of the 1990’s 
As stated in the introduction, Chile’s reform started in the mid 1970’s. The aim of the 
reform was to attract more private investment and enable the housing market to work more 
efficiently with the hope that urban land could yield better investment returns even for 
social housing schemes (Rojas, 2001). Accordingly, the MINVU was to cease all 
developing activities and act now as a facilitator on the demand side by subsidising 
mortgages to the poor. The World Bank with whom Chile had challenging relations 
praised the market conditions of Chile in the early 1990’s stating that the country had been 
able to provide three key elements in its housing programme: (a) specific targeting of the 
poor; (b) transparency; and (c) private market provision (World Bank, 1993). For an 
account of the struggles between Chile, the World Bank and other international 
organisations that were at the time unconvinced of the benefits of subsidies, see Gilbert 
(2002). Soon the Chilean model was considered best practice (Gilbert, 1997) and other 
Latin American countries adopted the subsidised system. 
Socio-economic conditions, more than politics, drove the subsidised system in all countries 
under study here; bringing, therefore, divergences in terms of the percentage of housing 
units that were subsidised and availability of credit, which depended on the value of the 
house. There were also differences on eligibility of applicants according to their minimum 
salaries (Gilbert, 1997; Chiape de Villa, 1999; Budds et al., 2005; Zanetta, 2005). But 
regardless of the particular socio-economic conditions, the system generally consisted of 
an A-B-C programme: Ahorro, Bono, Crédito (savings, subsidy and credit); whereby 
families with savings (ahorro) were eligible for a government subsidy (bono) and were 
better placed to achieve a bank loan (crédito) in order to complete the funds and purchase 
a home. As the following section shows, this structure was the results of the dissemination 
of new ideas spreading at the time on the way informal settlers developed their dwellings. 
4.2 The influence of John Turner 
Around the 1960’s and 1970’s the architect John Turner spent time in Peru and other Lat. 
Am. countries studying informal developments. Turner found that households improved 
their houses incrementally (Turner, 1977). He argued that their self-help approach was 
better than the large scale schemes developed so far by the governments and that a 
system of progressive building based on families’ savings was better suited to solve the 
housing deficit, particularly, for the very poor, thereby, improving their standards of living 
and contributing positively to economic development. His ideas were popularised around 
the mid 1990’s as well as those of others with similar views on self-build solutions (Pugh, 
1990; and for a criticism to Turner see, for instance, Werlin, 1999). Site-and-services 
schemes that originated after these theories intended to provide serviced land to poor 
families or group of families that had a plan or community plan and were able to build with 
technical support from the municipality. Help was provided on condition that benefited 
families would send their children to school and, thus, break the poverty cycle. 
All countries under study here implemented progressive building or upgrading schemes of 
some sort as part of their subsidised programmes. Nearly twenty years later, current 
reviews of those past programmes are mixed. Some claim that municipalities did not 
welcome upgrading programmes as they doubted they could collect service charges from 
very poor families and, therefore, the investment in infrastructure was unlikely to be 
recovered. This had the effect that municipalities and sometimes the government 
themselves either restricted available land for these projects or rejected them altogether 
(Gilbert, 1997; Budds et al., 2005). Others argue that the progressive building strategy lent 
itself to abuse as it was just an excuse to deliver low quality unfinished units (Chiape de la 
Villa, 1999). Positive views of upgrading informality and site-and-service plans shows that 
the scheme has been more successful at targeting the very poor than the massive new 
built complexes, as in the former the beneficiaries own their houses outright with no 
mortgage, while the latter represents a burden (Gilbert, 1997; Rojas, 1999; Green and 
Ortúzar, 2002; Boldarini, 2008). Nevertheless, at the end of the 1990’s and for reasons 
that still need to be researched, the four countries under study have tended to favour the 
delivery of new homes whilst reducing progressively less subsidies towards other 
alternatives.  
4.3 Implementation of the Subsidised System  
Whatever the programme, be it progressive building, site-and-services or upgrading, the 
mechanism whereby the state helps to subsidise the demand for housing units prevailed. 
This was a major change in countries that had traditionally relied on the national 
governments for the supply of social housing. Understandably, new procedural issues 
emerged as changes became operational. One of the major challenges was how to create 
a more attractive market for the private sector. Two main barriers had to be addressed: the 
reduction in planning bureaucracy and the legalisation of land titles (Borja and Castells, 
2002; Cuenya, 2005; Barreto, 2013). The way to reduce bureaucracy was to decentralise 
activities, which in Lat. Am. at the time was complicated as provincial governments were 
dependent on the national state with a highly centralised administration system. On the 
other hand, capital cities had always been under suspicion that they were too independent 
from their governments and this is still a current problem; the cases of Bogota and Buenos Aires 
are paradigmatic as they have a history of being ruled by the opposition party to the 
national government (Rodriguez-Acosta and Rosenbaum, 2005; de Duren, 2006; Thibert 
and Osorio, 2014). A fine balance needed to be achieved between relinquishing central 
powers to the provinces and strengthening their capacity to take new functions while 
keeping metropolitan areas under control.  
Not surprising, the process has received severe criticism in all the four countries. Some 
argue that the decentralisation was heavily politicised and that power was given to 
provinces in exchange of political support to pursue wider reforms (Coy and Pöhler, 2002; 
Zanetta, 2005). As stated in the introduction, all countries were simultaneously undergoing 
an extensive programme of privatisation of their national infrastructure networks and 
services and support from local government was needed to implement these changes. 
Other critics to the decentralisation process focus on the lack of coordinated action at the 
government level and, particularly, the unregulated public-private interaction, which 
fragmented the industry sector. Small construction companies, for example, preferred to 
lobby for work with local governments while large firms preferred communication with 
higher levels of government (Cuenya, 2005). Unavoidably, this often led to a duplication of 
actions (Budds, et al., 2005; Rodriguez-Acosta and Rosenbaum, 2005). Notwithstanding, 
when subsidies were kept centralised in order to control activities, critics claimed that the 
power of the municipalities (who were in a better place to asses local needs) were being 
curtailed (Chiape de Villa, 1999; Tachópulos Sierra, 2008).  
Not only was the process of decentralisation facing discontentment, but the effect of 
legalisation of land titles also started to be questioned. Mainly because even if a family 
managed to succeed in clearing the bureaucracy of obtaining the title, their inability of 
fulfilling land tax duties meant that they could be dispossessed by the government for non-
payment, which was seen as a worst situation than the previous when they had at least a 
“perceived” ownership of the land; see, for example, Van Gelder (2009) for the latest 
discussion on titling theories. And there were also those who stated that even poor families 
with legal titles, after undergoing the lengthily process of obtaining the subsidies, were 
refused credit by the banks (Varley, 1987; Gilbert, 1994; Van Gelder, 2009; Curevo and 
Jaramillo, 2009). Finally, the subsidies themselves were deemed unsustainable. In Brazil, 
the 1990’s was a decade dominated by high inflation, which did not offer stable conditions 
for the private sector, nor did it allow for government subsidies (Fonseca, 1998; Valenza, 
1998; Morais,Saad Filho and Coelho, 1999; Valenca, 2001; Azevedo, 2007; Valeza and 
Bonates, 2009). Argentina saw most of the social housing projects delivered by NGOs as 
the government were unable to create sustainable priced mortgages (Murillo, 2001). In 
Colombia the lengthy process of mortgage applications (usually over 10 months) 
combined with the housing boom created by these very same programmes meant that by 
the time candidates managed to gather all necessary funds (savings,  subsidy, and credit), 
the dwelling or plot of land of their choice was out of reach (Gilbert, 1997; Chiape de Villa, 
1999). 
However, the biggest failure for all the countries was that despite the promises of targeting 
the very poor, those with no access to formal jobs were unable to benefit from any of the 
plans. Even in Chile, targeting the very poor proved difficult and the system was heavily 
subsidised by the government (Gilbert, 1997; Rojas, 1999). Furthermore, as Rojas 
suggests, much of what was achieved in terms of attracting the private sector was possible 
due to the country’s economic growth (rising employment rate, consumer confidence and 
rise in interest rates, all beneficial conditions for the private sector). The fragility of the 
system became evident at the end of the 1990’s when unstable economic conditions 
generated an increase in mortgage interest rates that saw the collapse of many 
programmes and institutions across all the countries but Chile. Unavoidably, when 
transferring the system to other countries with larger housing deficits and thousands living 
informally hoping for subsidies, the so called Chilean model faces bigger challenges. It is 
interesting to point out that towards the turn of the century, Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia 
had to divert subsidy funds to support the administration of an increasing demand (Gilbert, 
1997; Chiape de Villa, 1999; Tachópulos Sierra, 2008; Cuervo and Jaramillo, 2009). Still a 
decade later some argue that the financial conditions at the time were not mature enough 
to attract institutional investors capable of providing private funding for housing 
programmes, let alone provide a solution for the lowest sector of the population as it was 
claimed by the World Bank (Soto and Torche, 2004; Zanetta, 2005). As it will be 
demonstrated in the following section, the failure to complement government subsidies 
with a share of the more profitable high end residential market also played a part in the 
collapse of the system.  
4.4 Gated Communities during the 1990’s 
Simultaneous to opening-up the markets for private capital to support social housing, the 
process facilitated private investment in other areas of RE. As it will be explained later, the 
decentralisation of planning and lack of coordination across different government levels 
described above, provided a fertile ground for the high end residential investment, which 
was reported as the most profitable RE business in Lat. Am. during the 1990’s (de Duren, 
2006). 
Gated communities have been defined as residential areas were public spaces have been 
privatised; they can either be in the city or the suburbs and in affluent or poor 
neighbourhoods (Blakely and Snyder, 1997). The mode of transport prevailing for the 
gated communities is the car, following the American example of peripheral cities, which 
was encouraged through the New Urbanism charter. In all countries under study, urban 
sprawl accelerated when motorways were expanded during the 1990’s, fuelled by private 
investment. As motorways are mainly private enterprises, most operate on toll systems 
which, for those who can afford it, considerably reduces the commute to the city (Thuillier, 
2005; Bäbr and Borsdorf, 2005; de Duren, 2006; Borsdorf et al., 2007). Inevitably, shorter 
commute increased the demand for dream houses in suburbia. 
During the 1990’s as it is today, the families relocating to gated communities are mostly of 
the same socio-economic background, as the level of service charge for maintenance of 
communal grounds and facilities (which can be as diverse as swimming pools to golf 
courses and helipads) act as a barrier to social mix. The newest trend is “affordable” 
condominiums for the middle classes, which have fewer amenities but still enjoy private 
security, one of the main concerns for many Latin Americans (Coy and Pöhler, 2002; de 
Duren, 2006). Infrastructure around these complexes usually includes health centres, 
education facilities and cemeteries, all privately paid by locals. New businesses either 
follow or precede the opening of a gated community, including large shopping malls and 
supermarkets (Coy and Pöhler, 2002; Borsdorf et al., 2007). During the 1990’s and given 
that most municipalities lacked a long term plan, most of these infrastructure projects were 
executed by private investors, who are mostly responsible for the layout of the periphery of 
most cities in Lat. Am. Briefly and broadly speaking, all countries share the same pattern: 
the new community is initiated by a developer or a business consortium who assumes the 
responsibility for the entire project, from gathering investors, to buying the land, 
architectural design, planning application, construction and sales of units to final 
consumers. After the families move in, services and maintenance of the communities’ site 
can be provided by the developing firm, outsourced or can be undertaken by the residents 
themselves organised in a cooperative (Coy and Pöhler, 2002; Borsdorf et al., 2007).The 
urban periphery is the preferred place for most gated communities, sometimes 
encroaching agricultural lands. This is due to land availability and also given the high 
return that can be achieved compared to more consolidated areas of the city. Turning rural 
land into urban, for example, reportedly generates profits of up 550% of the original value 
(Chiape de Villa, 1999).  
Some argue that these types of developments bring benefits to areas that are 
characterised by informality (Sabattini et al., 2001; Salcedo and Torres, 2004). The 
argument is that the new spaces of the wealthy are providing workplaces for the poor, for 
example, in construction, security, and domestic service. Figures published so far show 
that this is partly true (Thuillier, 2005). However, the benefits that municipalities receive in 
terms of developers’ contributions and taxes from new residents have been questioned by 
some (Brain and Sabatini, 2006; Thibert and Osorio, 2014).These authors maintain that 
new developments tend to be located in poor municipalities, with a large informal 
population and little infrastructure. This means small local authorities already struggling to 
collect revenues. Therefore, these offices see the arrival of a new gated community as a 
way to generate jobs and tend to compete with other municipalities to attract these 
developments by offering tax incentives to developers. In Chile, for example, the increase 
in land prices and the failure of the system to impose stricter regulations on developers 
means that the State is the main provider of the sites for social housing (Brain and 
Sabatini, 2006). As these authors suggest, increased construction costs are also part of 
the problem, and given that the subsidies have a cap, the only solution to keep developing 
social housing is by building on fiscal land; making the authors speculate the possibility 
that the State is undervaluing sites in order to complete politically charged projects to win 
more votes. Considering the argument explained in the previous section, stating that 
progressive building is lowering construction costs, it seems plausible that Chilean 
construction companies are indeed benefiting from the subsidised system.  
The case of the small municipalities in metropolitan Buenos Aires is also paradigmatic. 
Here the planning process is lengthy and opaque, as planning delay usually pushes 
developers to break ground as soon as the land is purchased. This is done with the hope 
that planning permission will be “solved” at some stage by the local officer (de Duren, 
2006; Thuillier, 2005). To add to the problem, once the new wealthy residents move in, 
their tendency is to contest municipal tax as they consider that all their services are 
privately paid so they see no reason to pay municipal taxes. 
Faced with similar problems during the late 1990’s, local authorities in Colombia were 
requested to develop a strategy plan (Ley de desarrollo Territorial 388, 1997-still in force) 
(Alcaldía de Bogota Ley 388, 1997). New municipal funds were also created (Fondos 
Municipales de Vivienda de Interés Social), with the aim of collecting and managing 
revenues for social housing programmes. While the strategy plan allows municipalities to 
identify land for social housing, the municipal funds equip them with regulations to pursue 
development contributions from the private sector. This is done either by the demand of 
land for social housing from the land owner or by a development levy paid by developers 
(Chiape de Villa, 1999; Tachópulos Sierra, 2008). However, there are concerns that the 
regulation is not fully enforced (Carrión Barrero, 2008) and that: municipalities only 
produce a plan just to comply with the national law; and the reality in Colombia is very 
much like that of Chile and Argentina-developers rule the land.  
The 1990’s ended with successive economic crisis that affected the largest economies in 
the region. In Colombia, mortgage rates increased from 6% to 20% in the year 2000 
(Cuervo and Jarmillo, 2009). The national government had to introduce a very 
controversial new tax to help the banks cope with defaults. The Nacional Institute for 
Social Houisng and Urban Reform (INURBE) went into liquidation by decree and a new 
institution was created (Fondo Nacional de Vivienda -Fonvivienda). This national housing 
fund was to act as facilitator and channel resources of the new plan initiated in 2002, 
which looked again (similar to previous plans) at decentralising activities as a solution 
(Escobar, 2001; Tachópulos Sierra, 2008). Argentina and Brazil’s social housing plans and 
subsidising programmes suffered similar problems. However, as it will be shown in the 
following section, the severity of their financial crisis in 1999 and 2001 saw drastic political 
swings that dramatically changed their welfare systems.  
5. Building the Way out of Recession 
During the critical years at the turn of the millennium, the construction of social housing 
reduced considerably. Notwithstanding, as policies in recession years are mainly aimed at 
keeping unemployment low, most countries continued to support the construction of the 
more reliable luxury end of the market. Colombia, for example, established the Ahorro de 
Fomento A la Construcción (AFC) system (literally, savings to support the construction 
industry). This is basically a mechanism by which the buyer of a new unit of RE has a tax 
exception, which in some cases is equivalent to three and four times the subsidy of a 
social housing unit (Cuervo and Jaramillo, 2009). However, as the wealthy received tax 
exemptions in this country, the poor received free houses as the economic conditions 
improved around 2007, thereby, improving their standards of living. The government 
launched the 100,000 Viviendas Gratis plan in 2012 (Gobierno de Colombia, Haciendo 
Casas Cambiamos Vidas). The beneficiaries were families that suffered from 
environmental disasters or during the drug trafficking wars. This new scheme was a last 
attempt to target the elusive bottom of the pyramid, that is, the very poor families, and 
followed World Bank recommendations. It is a very different approach to the World Bank’s 
attitude during the 1970’s when free housing provision was seen as dangerous as it could 
induce larger rural-urban migration, straining the cities even more (Pugh, 1990).  
In Brazil, the worker’s party introduced subsidy programmes of a large scale through the 
programme Minha Casa Minha Vida (PMCMV). There are claims that this was a way the 
government faced the 2008 financial crisis and that it was mainly driven by the 
construction sector (Arantes and Fix, 2009; Macedo, 2010; Cardoso et al., 2011). There 
are also problems with quality (Kowaltowslki et al., 2006). Some critics have stated that if 
customers had a choice, i.e. were able to buy a non-subsidised home, the whole scheme 
and the construction companies will be out of business (Formoso et al., 2011).  
Mass social housing programmes in these four countries run parallel with the rise of the 
megaproyecto for the upper classes. These are larger than previously developed 
communities that are now intended for more than 50,000 people (Coy and Pöhler, 2002, 
de Duren, 2006). Furthermore, given the increasing fear of crime, all sectors of the 
population these days prefer the sense of security offered by gated developments and so 
the “gated megaproyectos” now serve the wealthy as well as the poor (Bäbr and Borsdorf, 
2005; de Duren, 2006; Borsdorf et al., 2007). The fragmented city is, thus, spreading 
across Lat. Am. where gated ghettoes of the upper class are “mixing” with gated social 
housing projects in the periphery. The monotony of the urban landscape exacerbates 
when the same consortium of investors and developers (bearing in mind they are also 
architects and designers) operate across many Latin American countries (Coy and Pöhler, 
2002, p. 358). Still, most problematic is the land struggle that this generates: where a new 
gated community for the wealthy appears, it immediately takes up good land that becomes 
unaffordable for social housing (Brain and Sabatini, 2006). Land squatting becomes then 
the only solution for those who seek employment in the new gated community. Informality 
erupts and spreads around enclaves of wealth, usually taking poor quality land that has no 
interest for RE investors. The pattern of a sea of informality, with patches of wealth and 
housing estates described in the introduction as the fragmented city, is then completed.  
Notwithstanding, some changes are emerging, such as the territorial law in Colombia 
explained in the previous section. Still most authors agree that Brazil is leading the way in 
development contributions. The Special Social Interest Zones (ZEIS) is a new regulation 
that requires cities to contribute with a certain percentage of social housing for all 
developments (Prefeitura de São Paulo Decree 44.667, 2004). Currently this regulation 
has only been applied in Sao Paulo but with promising results, given that social housing 
schemes resulting from these programmes intend to target different sectors of the 
population encouraging a more social mix (Budds et al., 2005). The other system used in 
Brazil is the sale of vouchers for development rights in exchange for social housing. In this 
system, if a developer wants to build above the ratio that the size and location of the plot 
allows, he or she can negotiate this and obtain vouchers that can be either auctioned in 
the RE market or used in other sites. In addition, properties that are unoccupied and are 
considered suitable for social housing whose owners have a land tax debt, can exchange 
the property for land tax credit. The legislation means that there are no monetary 
transactions, which increase transparency for parties, the debtors and the creditors, and 
the local authority in question acquires a new unit of RE for social housing.  
In contrast, Argentina and Chile still fail to target the private sector, leaving the 
responsibility to deliver serviced land to municipalities. As a consequence, and given the 
extremely difficult economic circumstances that Argentina currently faces, most 
municipalities have reduced their social housing targets (Barreto, 2012). Furthermore, 
some municipalities are so short of resources that they have started to divert most of the 
subsidies to the payment of municipal employees. A similar situation of diversion of 
subsidies to cover for other shortcomings was seen in Colombia during the time of the 
Instituto de Crédito Territorial (ICT), the State-run social housing provider that operated 
until the 1990’s reform (Tachópulos Sierra, 2008) and during the closing days of the 
INURBE. The deviation of funding from housing to pay for an administrative system that is 
unable to cope with a large population in need seems to be a recurrent fault throughout 
the decades in these countries.  
To tackle these irregularities, Argentina is currently attempting to reverse the 
decentralisation process and intends to control resources from the State (Scheinshon and 
Cabrera, 2009). This has generated a new wave of clashes between national government 
and the opposition, particularly, with the Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires. As these 
authors suggest, the only hope for social housing projects are in the hands of NGOs and 
social activist movements who are able to lobby between the two political factions. By 
profiting from the lack of government cooperation, organisations like Madres the Plaza de 
Mayo and Piqueteros are finding a place as social housing developers.  
6. DISCUSSION  
As demonstrated in the preceding sections, all four countries studied have followed a path 
of developing gated communities for the rich, starting with country clubs in the 1970s and 
continuing with the megaproyectos of today. Equally they all share a modality of 
developing social housing neighbourhoods, with very little infrastructure and services. To 
complete the landscape, a myriad of precariously constructed homes that steadily spread 
since the 1960’s occupies unwanted plots or lands that are prone to natural disasters. It is 
true that Chile is solving the housing deficit, but the price paid is an increase of inequality, 
with ghettoes for the poor as well as for the wealthy. As a result of the spatial polarity, all 
countries fail to achieve social mix. This is troublesome in many ways. The lack of contact 
with other groups is harbouring fear of the other and fuelling the trend in security, walls and 
gates in residential developments at all scales of society. Equally this lack of engagement 
with other sectors of the population manifests itself in public places and services. As has 
been established, the wealthy tend to pay for private education, health, and even the 
maintenance of common public areas, including the streets. This increases the perception 
that state provision of public services are less effective, and only fit to use by those who 
have no other resources. The decentralisation of the state explained here, contributes to 
this idea of a failing state, tarnishing in the process the image of the municipal authorities 
who have little power to impose planning laws against speculative development. 
The most worrying aspect of this fragmentation of society is the lack of empathy that it 
generates. As it has been established, the unwillingness to contribute with municipal taxes 
by a sector of the society that sees no benefit in state run services challenges the 
provision of social services by the municipality and local government. Repeatedly, after the 
economic crisis at the turn of the century and after the 2008 crisis, municipalities have 
tended to divert housing subsidies towards other ends. As seen in the case of Argentina 
for example, that used subsidies to pay employees, or as seen in Colombia, where due to 
the large number of applicants for social housing programmes, the country had to divert 
funds to the management of these very programmes. There are no reports that Brazilian 
municipalities are diverting housing subsidies to support the maintenance of social 
services, but the country’s growth rate is diminishing, and this can have an effect on the 
deliverance and maintenance of the ambitious PMCMV. In Chile, as seen, there is a 
“hidden” subsidy provided by the State as the main supplier of development land for social 
housing schemes. This highlights the fact that the very much praised Chilean subsidised 
system is only superficially working, given that the State is having to contribute with the 
land. The success in reducing the housing deficit in Chile is due mainly to the small 
number of people in need of a home that the country has if compared to the other 
countries under study here. 
There is a systematic failure to complement government subsidies with a share of the 
more profitable high end residential market in all countries. Developers appear as a very 
powerful group, and as demonstrated, municipal authorities tend to compete with other 
municipalities to attract large luxury developments by offering tax incentives to developers. 
In doing so, municipal authorities not only fail to collect much needed revenues, but they 
induce a hike in land prices, in some cases in the periphery by over 500%. Given that the 
periphery is also the preferred location for social housing, the boost in land value by luxury 
developments immediately curtails the possibilities of housing the poor. The above 
mentioned Ley 388 in Colombia and the ZEIS in Brazil are a step in the right direction, but 
much more is needed in order to spread the economic benefits of urban development that 
the upper classes are currently enjoying so that the poor can also share.  
Another underlying principle ruling housing policies in all these countries is the reliance on 
the construction industry as an important economic driver (Gilbert, 1997, Murillo, 2001; 
Cuervo and Jaramillo, 2009; Scheinshon and Cabrera, 2009). Whether building luxury 
homes or social housing, construction is the industry that serves the government to control 
unemployment, particularly, in times of recession. It is not a mere coincidence that the rise 
of the megaproyecto explained above appeared at the turn of the century, just as the 
region faced the largest economic crisis in history. It seems that the bigger the recession, 
the bigger the construction project. In a region with a large unskilled labour force, turning 
to the construction industry to help the economy seems a logical approach. Still, the 
economic argument of spending in infrastructure and construction to help improve the 
economies needs to be underpinned by good governance and a robust planning system, 
whereby redistributive mechanisms are secured to share prosperity with all sectors of the 
population. As it stands, the current system of underfunded municipalities operating with 
obscure planning regulations that are easily changed to suit speculative developers will 
only benefit a privileged few and not the poor who constitute the majority, thereby, 
negating any efforts aimed at achieving economic development. It will not, in the long term, 
support the construction industry as a sustainable economic driver. The jury is out, for 
example, on whether the frenetic construction activity and projects delivered in Brazil 
before the World Cup 2014 will deliver a long term legacy. So far, reports from the media 
are that it will not. 
Chile and Argentina are the ones that are falling behind in urban equity, while Colombia 
and Brazil are making better efforts, although the latter with more moderate clear success. 
Thus, generally, real estate is doing little to achieve or improve economic development in 
the countries studied. The main reason is because it is falling to target social inequality, 
and curtailing opportunities at the bottom of the pyramid who have no access to the 
benefits of urban life. A weak State means that unrestricted private development is ruling 
the land. And as established from the experiences of the 1990’s, private enterprises in a 
context of fragile regulations and rule of law has not yielded optimal results in Latin 
America.  
7. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined the question of inequality in the context of  residential RE 
sector in Lat. Am. The countries under study represent all the different political tendencies: 
from populist Argentina, to centre-right Colombia. It can be argued that the provision of a 
free house would align with a populist government, but in this case, it is centre-right 
Colombia who is providing something for nothing through the 100,000 Viviendas Gratis 
programme. Still, as recent political campaigns show, all these governments use housing 
programmes as a way to win more voters. Using housing development as a political pawn 
puts pressure on governments to demonstrate quantifiable results to justify their promises, 
with little care for quality and standards. New alternatives to home ownership must be 
supported at the macro level to address housing deficits. For example, by encouraging 
leasing and rental practices for all sectors of the population and not just for the poor may 
avoid stigmatising the rental option. This should be implemented and framed by a fair and 
robust legislation of landlord/tenant relations. The rental option should be provided and 
managed by NGOs, local cooperatives or worker organisations who are free from 
corruption scandals to encourage a trickle-down transparency, avoiding rent default and 
vandalism, which are usual problems in current government-led rental schemes.  
As shown in this chapter, Brazil has found some innovative solutions for land value 
capture and to some extent so has Colombia. The Chilean model has served to reduce 
social housing deficit in that country, but as explained above, investment led planning 
seems to be stimulating spatial fragmentation and only benefiting a small section of the 
population. Paradoxically, the most populist government of the four countries, Argentina is 
the one falling behind in redistributive mechanism of land taxation. Lat. Am. is a region that 
has historically directed development towards the middle and upper classes. If the current 
conditions do not improve, uncontrolled RE development will only aggravate this tendency. 
If measures to spread economic benefits of urban development are not evenly distributed 
among all sectors of the population, the region will continue to be known as the most 
unequal in the world.  
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